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What Really Matters in
Spectrum Allocation Design
By Thomas W. Hazlett,* Roberto E. Muñoz** and Diego B. Avanzini***
I. INTRODUCTION
¶1

¶2

Economists and policy makers have embraced “spectrum auctions.”1 Assigning
wireless licenses to high bidders places assets with the most productive firms, reduces
rent-seeking costs incurred by comparative hearings or lotteries,2 and captures license
rents for the public treasury. This last benefit potentially increases efficiency, in that
funds generated without the use of taxes do not cause tax-distorting social losses. Each
tax dollar raised, for instance, is expected to cost society about $0.33 in deadweight loss.3
Auction dollars, as pure transfers, cost less.
Yet this “public finance bonus” is a delicate matter. Government allocates
spectrum, and regulation constrains its use.
Wireless licenses generate bids
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1
“Overall, the auctions have been a tremendous success . . . . Many countries wisely have imitated the
FCC auctions; those that have not have suffered from inefficient license assignments and other flaws.”
Peter Cramton, Spectrum Auctions, in 1 HANDBOOK OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS ECONOMICS: STRUCTURE,
REGULATION, AND COMPETITION 605, 606 (Martin E. Cave et al. eds., 2002); see also Ken Binmore & Paul
Klemperer, The Biggest Auction Ever: The Sale of the British 3G Telecom Licenses, 112 ECON. J. C74
(2002); Peter C. Cramton, Money Out of Thin Air: The Nationwide Narrowband PCS Auction, 4 J. ECON. &
MGMT. STRATEGY 267 (1995); Veronika Grimm et al., Low Price Equilibrium in Multi-unit Auctions: The
GSM Spectrum Auction in Germany, 21 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 1557 (2003); Paul Klemperer, How (Not) to
Run Auctions: The European 3G Telecom Auctions, 46 EUR. ECON. REV. 829 (2002) [hereinafter
Klemperer, How (Not) to Run Auctions]; Paul Klemperer, What Really Matters in Auction Design, 16 J.
ECON. PERSP., Winter 2002, at 169; R. Preston McAfee & John McMillan, Analyzing the Airwaves Auction,
10 J. ECON. PERSP., Winter 1996, at 159; John McMillan, Selling Spectrum Rights, 8 J. ECON. PERSP.,
Summer 1994, at 145; Patrick S. Moreton & Pablo T. Spiller, What’s in the Air: Interlicense Synergies in
the Federal Communications Commission’s Broadband Personal Communication Service Spectrum
Auctions, 41 J.L. & ECON. 677 (1998); Eric van Damme, The Dutch UMTS-Auction (Ctr. for Econ. Studies
& Ifo Inst. for Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 722, 2002); Elmar Wolfstetter, The Swiss UMTS
Spectrum Auction Flop: Bad Luck or Bad Design? 6 (Ctr. for Econ. Studies & Ifo Inst. for Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 534, 2001) [hereinafter Wolfstetter, The Swiss UMTS Spectrum Auction Flop].
2
See generally Thomas W. Hazlett & Robert J. Michaels, The Cost of Rent-Seeking: Evidence from
Cellular Telephone License Lotteries, 59 S. ECON. J. 425 (1993).
3
Klemperer, What Really Matters in Auction Design, supra note 1, at 179.
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approximately equal (in a competitive auction) to the present value of the profits
expected from owning such licenses. Policies that increase profits by reducing
competition in wireless markets are themselves economically distorting. Revenues
gained by the state cease to be pure transfers and incur social costs of their own.
Many are aware of this conflict and emphasize the importance of rules that promote
competition for end users. John McMillan, in one of the first scholarly papers explaining
the new wireless license auctions, was careful to note:
The Act [enabling auctions] downplays revenue as an objective, and by
its actions also the government showed that revenue was not its overriding
objective (as, indeed, it should not be). If revenue had been paramount, the
government could have offered a single monopoly license in each region—at the
cost, obviously, of creating future inefficiencies.4

¶4

¶5

¶6

Yet this important caveat has been only partly heeded. The formal economic literature on
wireless auctions focuses not on end-user efficiencies, but on bidding mechanisms.
Empirical evaluations are largely rendered on the basis of rent extraction. Auctions
resulting in prices exceeding expectations are deemed “successful”; those with
surprisingly low prices are “fiascoes” or “disasters.” License rents left on the table create
social inefficiency, sacrificing a possible public financing bonus.
Were auction policies simply transferring rents for the public treasury, this
operative assumption would reflect reality. Yet, rules advanced by economists and
widely adopted by policy makers repeatedly cross over the presumed line of demarcation,
altering efficiency in output markets. Imposing reserve prices, limiting the number of
licenses sold, providing bidding credits for weak competitors, and delaying license
assignments are regulatory policies advanced in response to the “low participation”
problem encountered at auctions. Economists largely evaluate these measures according
to their effectiveness in raising bids, ignoring retail market consequences.
Case studies reviewed in the literature illustrate the inconsistent incorporation of
final market welfare effects. Klemperer discusses an interesting Turkish mobile phone
license auction, wherein the government mandated that the price for a second national
license must equal or exceed the bid by the winner of the first license.5 That prompted
the first licensee to bid aggressively, such that a second operator would not pay the steep
entry fee; the result was monopoly market structure. Klemperer identifies this as “the
Turkish fiasco.”6
Alternatively, reserve prices set in Belgium and Greece auctions were applauded
for extracting additional government receipts, even though they excluded award of a
fourth 3G license in 2001 auctions (only three incumbents’ bids met the threshold; i.e.,
the policy was defended on the grounds that no fourth network would have likely
emerged even with a lower reserve price). Of course, with the probability above zero, the
expected loss merits consideration. Moreover, even without the entry of a fourth
operator, the policy left considerable bandwidth idle (as per the approximately 35
megahertz (MHz) allocated to the marginal licenses in either market). This impedes
4

McMillan, Selling Spectrum Rights, supra note 1, at 147.
Klemperer, What Really Matters in Auction Design, supra note 1, at 176.
6
Id. at 178. The Turkish government agreed and undid the monopoly outcome via new rules.
5
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reductions in incumbents’ marginal costs, imposing social losses. Such offsets to the
revenue-generating gains of the reserve price have not been appropriately incorporated.
¶7
As this Article shows, the reserve price policy in the two countries likely resulted in
large losses for Belgian and Greek consumers that overwhelmed any possible gains from
the public finance bonus. This empirical result, based on the relationship between
spectrum inputs and competitive rivalry in retail mobile telephone markets, quantifies the
importance of addressing welfare issues in wireless markets in a holistic fashion that
looks beyond government revenues. Efficiencies generated by license auctions are
evaluated in proper context when auction designs, bidder subsidies, license restrictions,
and other policies are evaluated with the response to their incremental auction revenues
and to the social costs incurred when radio frequencies are less-utilized, inefficient
suppliers win licenses, or multi-year delays reduce entry.
¶8
Many regulators have come to the conclusion—correctly, in this Article’s view—
that burgeoning use of smartphones, tablets, and other devices (including machine-tomachine radios) is driving a “mobile data tsunami” that demands massive new
bandwidth. Great productivity is feeding this beast, expanding networks, improving
speeds, and accommodating a range of innovative services and applications. The Federal
Communications Commission’s (FCC) National Broadband Plan issued in March 2010
specifically focuses on the importance of making additional spectrum available for
mobile uses. It identifies wireless broadband as a key contributor to U.S. economic
growth and an essential platform for the emerging broadband marketplace. Crucially,
more inputs are necessary to “ensure that there is sufficient, flexible spectrum that
accommodates growing demand and evolving technologies.”7
¶9
This is exactly correct. To maximize consumer welfare, spectrum allocators should
avoid being distracted by side issues like government license revenues. By focusing on
wireless market efficiency, getting abundant spectrum resources into a competitive
marketplace, policy makers can pave the way for low prices, high outputs, and robust
innovation. The economic forces unleashed will produce the highest social gains.
¶10
Part II offers a simple synopsis of this Article’s analysis using “order of
magnitude” estimates revealing the big picture—consumer gains in wireless output
markets dominate social welfare generated by government extractions for spectrum
inputs. Part III then describes the emphasis placed on revenue extraction by economists,
noting the inconsistent manner in which efficiency changes in output markets sometimes
enter the analysis. Part IV more specifically evaluates the argument that spectrum policy
makers should tolerate some inefficiency in wireless markets to produce social gains in
public finance. It finds this argument to be implausible given the institutions of the
market and the magnitudes of the relevant trade-offs. Part V defines a “regulatory
optimum.” Part VI offers a conclusion.
II. LICENSE AUCTIONS: TREES IN THE WIRELESS FOREST
¶11

Economic research has quantified the incremental trade-offs incurred in particular
spectrum allocation choices, as detailed below. The big picture, however, is perhaps best
illuminated by simple summary statistics.
7

FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, CONNECTING AMERICA: THE NATIONAL BROADBAND PLAN 75 (2010).
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In the first half of 2009, total U.S. mobile telephone service revenues were
approximately $75.8 billion.8 Of this, $56.3 billion was for basic subscriptions that
include voice service.9 The remaining $19.5 billion was for data services, primarily text
messages (SMS) and high-speed Internet connectivity.10 Industry sources report 1.16
trillion minutes of use (MOU) for voice services and 740 billion text messages.11 If the
voice revenues (total revenues minus data revenues) are divided by voice minutes, the
average price per minute is calculated to be $0.049. If text messages are included in total
MOU12 at the rate of 1 SMS = 1 minute, and total revenues are attributed entirely to voice
and text message services, then the average price per MOU (or text message) would be
$0.040. This overstates price by attributing high-speed data charges to voice and text,
when they properly belong to a third category. In the second half of 2008, messaging
(both text and multi-media) accounted for some thirty-six percent of wireless data
revenues.13 Using this metric for the first half of 2009 (1H2009) yields an average price
per MOU (counting 1 SMS = 1 MOU) of $0.033.

8

Targeted Information, Cellular Telecomms. & Internet Ass’n, Mid-Year 2009 Survey Results 1 (Oct. 7,
2009) (on file with author).
9
Id. (subtracting the revenues for data services from total revenues).
10
Id. at 2.
11
Id.
12
Including text messages in the voice minutes total is suggested by the fact that SMS is a substitute for
voice calls and pricing structures in the industry imply that looking at voice minutes and revenues
separately may distort actual economic outcomes. Of course, using an improper conversion (to add text
messages to voice minutes) may also distort the true picture. Setting text messages equal to one MOU in
terms of value appears to be a reasonable starting point.
13
Total wireless data revenues were reported to be $17.5 billion in the second half of 2008, while text
messaging revenues (broken out from total data revenue) were $6.3 billion. CELLULAR TELECOMMS. &
INTERNET ASS’N, CTIA’S WIRELESS INDUSTRY INDICES, SEMI-ANNUAL DATA SURVEY RESULTS: A
COMPREHENSIVE REPORT FROM CTIA ANALYZING THE U.S. WIRELESS INDUSTRY, YEAR-END 2008
RESULTS 112, 114 (2009) [hereinafter CTIA YEAR-END 2008].
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FIGURE 1. VOICE MINUTES AND TEXT MESSAGES IN U.S. MOBILE NETWORKS (1991–
2008)
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Market data from 1991 forward are available,14 showing revenues and MOU for the
U.S. mobile market. Until recently, complications presented by the voice-data divisions
were not an issue. There is now, however, a pronounced trend where mobile subscribers
are substituting text messaging for voice minutes.15
¶14
Making simple adjustments to the data smooths the long-run trend and accounts for
the emergence of texting in place of phone calling. The Cellular Telecommunications
and Internet Association’s data for wireless carrier revenues from 2001 to present are
broken out as “voice” or “data.” Text message revenues and quantities are also reported.
Hence, on the service revenue side, data expenditures are subtracted from total service
revenues and text message revenues are then added back in (this excludes revenues for
other data services, primarily high-speed Internet access). On the usage side, text
messages are added to voice minutes of use at a rate of 1 SMS = 1 MOU.
¶15
Figure 2 displays historic prices and outputs. Price is defined as the average
revenue (all spending for services by consumers) divided by the number of minutes used.
Quantity is defined as the total MOU. The trend in prices is sharply down, and the trend
in output is strongly up.
¶13

14

These data are published semi-annually by the Cellular Telecommunications and Internet Association, a
trade group composed of U.S. wireless carriers. Id. at 10–14.
15
See supra Figure 1.
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These data appear to assume the shape of a demand curve showing a negative
relationship between price and quantity demanded. This is not the case, however. Along
a given demand curve, the only variable influencing output is the price of the product.
Factors such as supply, quality of service, the price of substitutes, and the availability of
complements or substitutes change over time, and much time elapses between the points
along the curve in Figure 2—as much as sixteen years.
FIGURE 2. PRICES AND MOBILE VOICE MINUTES OF USE (1992–2008)
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¶17
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Still, the important mobile market demand drivers (apart from the price of wireless
service) are all predicted to influence demand in a positive direction.16 In the period
between 1991 and 2009, service prices fell dramatically, from over $0.50 per MOU to
about $0.04, a real decline of over ninety percent.17 This would be expected to lead to
substantial increases in minutes demanded. Indeed, consumption virtually exploded,
increasing from 11 billion MOU in 1991 to about 2.3 trillion MOU (excluding text
messages) in 2009—a 208-fold (20,800%) increase. It is likely that price was one of
16

It is also helpful that in an industry with substantial fixed costs, such as mobile telephony, there exists no
traditional supply curve. Marginal cost does not determine the quantity offered by firms, and mark-ups
over marginal cost are subject to strategic and long-run dynamics not easily captured in two dimensions. In
wireless markets it is also the case that capacity available for consumers has been shifting out (increasing)
over time, but the impact of this supply effect is captured in (a) lower prices and (b) higher quality service
(fewer blocked or dropped calls).
17
Prices are in current dollars. In constant 2008 dollars, differences are more than forty percent larger (due
to inflation). Constant 2008 dollars were obtained using the gross domestic product deflator series from the
International Monetary Fund’s World Economic Outlook 2011.
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many factors encouraging this robust output trend. Demand shifted outwards with rising
income, increasing quality of wireless services, broader network coverage, declining size
and price of handsets, increasing quality and functionality of handsets and batteries, the
introduction of popular mobile applications, and changing social norms regarding the use
of mobile phones and network connectivity.
¶18
Circumstances here allow us to view the historic price-quantity pairs as lowerbound estimates of current conditions with respect to consumer demand. Were higher
prices charged today, quantities demanded would contract but not, presumably, to less
than the usage levels observed in previous years when higher prices were, in fact,
observed. In essence, the market data from 1991 through 2008 yield information as to
the lower bound of the 2009 demand curve, allowing conservative forecasts of the value
currently delivered by wireless network services in the United States.
¶19
The basic calculation is displayed in Figure 3. Consumer surplus (CS) is the
incremental value obtained by customers in a particular market. It is formally defined as
what consumers are willing to pay for a good or service minus what they must pay to
obtain the product. The area under the “quasi-demand curve” is calculated as a discrete
integral, summing each of the incremental CS values associated with a historic pricequantity point (annualized), as prices monotonically fall over time. This method
produces slightly lower estimates than taking a continuous integral (for example, using a
close-fitting, fourth-order equation). Prices are all in constant 2008 dollars as adjusted by
the gross domestic product deflator series from the International Monetary Fund’s World
Economic Outlook 2011.
FIGURE 3. QUASI-DEMAND CURVE FOR VOICE AND TEXT MOBILE SERVICE (2008)
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Focusing only on voice revenues—Model 1—deduces a 2008 price (equal to
average voice revenue per voice MOU) of 0.0526 and about 2.2 trillion MOU for the
year. Consumer surplus, estimated conservatively as described above, is then forecast as
$174.1 billion annually (in constant 2008 dollars).18 Alternatively, by adding text
messages to voice MOU (at 1 SMS = 1 MOU)—Model 2—the substitution from phone
calls to text messages in recent years is plausibly incorporated. Revenue per MOU falls
to $0.0396, with 2008 MOU plus text messages rising to 3.2 trillion.19 Consumer surplus
is then calculated at $211.8 billion (in 2008 dollars).20
TABLE 1. ORDER-OF-MAGNITUDE COMPARISON:
AUCTION RECEIPTS VERSUS WIRELESS SERVICE VALUE
Metric
Total
U.S. Wireless
Service Revenues Voice & Text
Model 1
Consumer Surplus
Model 2
FCC Auction Revenues

Period
2009 (annual) (1H2009 x 2)
2009 (annual) (1H2009 x 2)
2009 (annual)
2009 (annual)
1994–2009 (lump sum)

Value
$151.7 billion
$127.1 billion
$174.1 billion
$211.8 billion
$53 billion

MHz
200
200
200
200
>280

$/MHz/pop
2.53
2.12
2.90
3.53
< 0.63 (CMRS)

¶21

These value magnitudes are important to consider in light of the revenues received
by the U.S. government for wireless licenses. Since license auctions began in July 1994,
the FCC has collected about $53 billion,21 a sum that includes many (mostly) non-cellular
licenses. The major mobile license (what the FCC generically calls Commercial Mobile
Radio Service, or CMRS, licenses) sales have been for personal communications services
(PCS) licenses A–F, allocated 120 MHz; advanced wireless services (AWS) licenses A–
F, allocated 90 MHz; and 700 MHz licenses, allocated 70 MHz.22
¶22
Mobile licenses allocating some 230 MHz (nationwide) have been sold via FCC
auctions through 2008. All told, however, licenses assigned to mobile operators were
18

This is somewhat above the level of 2008 revenues, indicating a CS-to-revenue ratio that is in line with
econometric estimates of consumer surplus in mobile markets. See Jerry Hausman, Cellular, 3G,
Broadband and WiFi, Shann Memorial Lecture at the University of Western Australia (Mar. 18, 2003). It
is below the 2010 consumer surplus estimate produced for the Cellular Telecommunications and Internet
Association, the U.S. mobile operators’ trade group, by consulting firm Ovum, which estimated 2010
consumer surplus to be $263 billion. ROGER ENTNER, CELLULAR TELECOMMS. & INTERNET ASS’N, THE
INCREASINGLY IMPORTANT IMPACT OF WIRELESS BROADBAND TECHNOLOGY AND SERVICES ON THE U.S.
ECONOMY: A FOLLOW UP TO THE 2005 OVUM REPORT ON THE IMPACT OF THE US WIRELESS TELECOM
INDUSTRY ON THE US ECONOMY 19 (2008).
19
In fact, SMS revenues in 2008 were approximately ten percent of voice revenues. Basic calling plans
must generally be purchased by customers before they can purchase text messages, which are usually
bought in packages—200 for $5 per month, unlimited texting for $20, and so on. CTIA YEAR-END 2008,
supra note 13, at 114.
20
See infra Table 1.
21
FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, MOVING FORWARD: DRIVING INVESTMENT AND INNOVATION WHILE
PROTECTING CONSUMERS 10 (2009) [hereinafter MOVING FORWARD], available at http://www.fcc.gov/fccmoving-forward-report.pdf.
22
These were awarded in auctions held 2002–2008; license letters were re-used during that process. In
addition to these licenses, other bandwidth can potentially be used to compete with CMRS operators,
including those allocated 2.5 GHz frequencies for use in Broadband Radio Services or Educational
Broadband Services; General Wireless Services allocated 2.3 GHz spectrum; a license allocated 5 Hz at
1.605 GHz; and satellite telephone licenses permitted to supply terrestrial mobile phone services on an
ancillary basis to their main satellite operations.
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allocated about 345 MHz. Only about 200 MHz of this total was actually in use at the
end of 2008.23 The 90 MHz allocated to AWS licenses and assigned by auction in
September 2006, was still being “cleared” of federal users and was largely off-limits for
private operators.24 Of the 700 MHz spectrum, only the 6 MHz use by Qualcomm’s
MediaFlo (a mobile television application marketed through mobile phone carriers) had
been deployed; the other 64 MHz was held by carriers planning to use the frequencies for
advanced systems being developed.25
TABLE 2. MOBILE (CMRS) LICENSES AUCTIONED AND IN USE (YEAR-END 2008)
Date

Total
Revenue
(billions)

Nationwide
MHz

$/MHz/pop

Implied Value of
200 MHz
Nationwide

PCS A, B

Mar. 1995

7.721

60

$0.51

$30.6 billion

PCS C, D, E, F

Dec.
1995–Feb.
2005

not applicable

60

not applicable

not applicable

2004

4.8

10

$1.7

$102 billion

PCS Re-auction

Feb. 2005

2.043

not applicable

$0.98

$58.8 billion

AWS

Sept. 2006

13.7

90

$0.54

$32.4 billion

lower 700 MHz

2002–2003

18

$0.03

$1.8 billion

upper 700 MHz

Mar. 2008

$1.2

$72 billion

License Sale

Nextel @ 1.9
GHz

18.957

52

Total

230

Mean (excluding lower 700 MHz)
Total CMRS MHz deployed

26

$59.2 billion
194

23

RYSAVY RESEARCH, MOBILE BROADBAND SPECTRUM DEMAND (2008).
Comments of T-Mobile USA, Inc., Relocation of Federal Systems in the 1710–1755 MHz Frequency
Band: Review of the Initial Implementation of the Commercial Spectrum Enhancement Act, Docket No.
0906231085-91085-01 (Nat’l Telecomms. & Info. Admin., Aug. 21, 2009).
25
See infra Table 2. Verizon and AT&T, which own fourth generation (4G) licenses, announced plans to
deploy 4G mobile wireless systems with long-term evolution (LTE) networks in the second half of 2010.
Christopher M. Larsen et al., Telecommunications Services: Comments by Verizon CTO Indicate Limited
Upside to Tower Revs For LTE in ’10, PIPER JAFFRAY (2010).
26
RYSAVY RESEARCH, supra note 23, at 23. Bazelon breaks out the then- (or soon-) available bandwidth
for mobile operators as: 50 MHz cellular (800 MHz band), 120 MHz PCS (1.9 GHz band), 29 MHz
specialized mobile radio (800, 900, and 1900 MHz bands). This totals 199 MHz. Bazelon also notes
availability of 174 MHz (at 2.5 GHz) for wireless services. Coleman Bazelon, Licensed or Unlicensed: The
Economic Considerations in Incremental Spectrum Allocations, 47 IEEE COMM. MAG. 110, 112 tbl.1
(2009). See generally Thomas W. Hazlett, Spectrum Tragedies, 22 YALE J. ON REG. 242 (2005). These
frequencies, allocated from the early 1960s to licenses assigned for such services as educational video, have
been the subject of numerous fragmentation problems as per the regulatory definition of usage rights.
Clearwire, a firm receiving investments and partnership agreements from Sprint, Intel, Google, Motorola,
Comcast and Time Warner, in addition to equity investments from its 2008 initial public offering, has
aggregated many of the licenses and is attempting to build a nationwide wireless broadband network
deploying advanced 4G “Wimax” technology. In the third quarter of 2009, it reported 555,000 U.S.
customers. Press Release, Clearwire, Clearwire Reports Third Quarter 2009 Results (Nov. 10, 2009),
http://corporate.clearwire.com/releasedetail.cfm?ReleaseID=551159. If the 2.5 GHz frequencies were to
host viable competitive entry into the mass market for mobile services, this would have a profound impact
on the competitive structure of the industry. Given the uncertain nature of this competitive foray, and the
24
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The wireless services supplied using approximately just 200 MHz allocated to
mobile phone licenses enabled substantial economic activity. As summarized by the
revenue and consumer surplus estimates, the magnitudes dominate license revenues.
Even without adjusting for the fact that license revenues are primarily transfers rather
than newly created wealth (with the public finance bonus about 0.33), services produce
consumer gains of at least $2.90 or $3.50 per MHz per person per year. In contrast,
license revenues are, at the most (i.e., attributing all federal auction receipts to the 200
MHz in use, when far more than that has been allocated to the licenses sold through
2008), about $0.63 per MHz per person as a one-time payment to the government.27
¶24
The implication is that the yearly gains from using spectrum for consumers (and
ignoring profits generated by producers, another source of social benefit) appear to be at
least four times the lump sum payments made for licenses. If a real discount rate of five
percent is appropriate,28 then perpetual annual flows are transformed into present values
at a rate of twenty-to-one. This implies that the consumer benefit delivered by mobile
markets are at least eighty times the magnitude of the receipts captured by FCC license
auctions. An apples-to-apples comparison of efficiency gains would then imply that the
license revenues must be reduced by two-thirds to reflect the social savings (not merely
the transfers) implied by auction receipts. This implies that the efficiencies associated
with retail services in mobile markets are about 240 times as large as those associated
with license revenues.29
¶25
This more than two order of magnitude difference puts spectrum allocation policy
into sharp focus. Delicate adjustments that seek to juice auction receipts but also alter
competitive forces in wireless operating markets are inherently risky. A policy that has
an enormous impact in increasing license revenues need impose only tiny proportional
costs in output markets to undermine its social utility. So, for example, a new auction
design that (heroically) doubled auction revenues would, if it reduced consumer surplus
by just one-half of one percent, produce costs in excess of benefits.
¶26
Policy makers and economists have devoted considerable energy to designing and
then redesigning spectrum allocation rules and license auction platforms. They have
often looked to sales of licenses at high prices as “successes” and sales at low prices as
“fiascoes.” Economists have justified this enthusiasm for revenue on efficiency grounds:
the more money transferred to the government in auctions, the less money the
government must raise via taxes. Taxes of the usual sort are highly distortive; firms and

difficulty in assessing the scope and value of the bandwidth rights available to operators, the 2.5 GHz
spectrum is generally excluded from totals given for the bandwidth available to mobile carriers (as in the
200 MHz estimate for year-end 2008).
27
Licenses sold at auction are issued for fixed terms, but are renewed indefinitely so long as the licensee
complies with perfunctory rules. In effect, licenses are assigned permanently for a lump sum payment.
28
A five percent real rate is generally appropriate for discounting future flows in cost-benefit calculations.
Robert W. Hahn, The Economic Analysis of Regulation: A Response to the Critics, 71 U. CHI. L. REV.
1021, 1026–27 (2004). The lower the rate, the higher the present value of the annual consumer surplus
flows.
29
Other economists have found that consumer surplus is similarly one or two orders of magnitude the size
of producers’ surplus in wireless markets. See generally ENTNER, supra note 18; Hausman, supra note 18;
Jerry A. Hausman, Valuing the Effect of Regulation on New Services in Telecommunications, 1997
BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY: MICROECONOMICS 1; Gregory L. Rosston, The Long and Winding
Road: The FCC Paves the Path with Good Intentions, 27 TELECOMM. POL’Y 501 (2003).
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individuals engage in costly activity just to avoid paying them. The rule of thumb is that
a dollar of taxes raised by the state results in about one-third of a dollar in distortion costs
(in addition to the dollar transferred to the public treasury).30 By raising a dollar in a
license sale, then, one-third of a dollar is saved—under the assumption that government
spending remains fixed (does not increase with the spectrum revenue windfall).
¶27
Such thinking, and other more political concerns, has pushed spectrum policy and
auction rules in the direction of revenue extraction. This has proven costly. Among
these costly policies are such measures or strategies as: delays in auctioning licenses, as
the government waits until bids will be higher; reserve prices, which leave licenses
unsold if minimum bids are not received; bidding credits for weak bidders, intensifying
competition with strong bidders; and reducing the number of licenses sold, inducing
simple monopoly power.
¶28
Indeed, each of the measures in some way seeks to reduce the probability-adjusted
supply of spectrum in the mobile market. This is costly in that spectrum is a key input
into wireless services. If it is withheld—or delayed, pared back, or restricted in its use—
the market cannot fully optimize (or cost minimize) in supplying services. More costly
alternatives will be undertaken, such as deploying more expensive technologies, building
more infrastructure (base stations, with greater cell splitting), or simply reducing network
access through higher prices.
¶29
Because the social gains from additional license receipts are relatively tiny, the
focus of policy makers interested in maximizing consumer welfare is rightly on the
mission of market efficiency. Yet, much spectrum allocation has become distracted.
Policies are offered to intentionally create market power, increasing license rents:
“[S]ince alternative taxes entail an enormous welfare loss, it is even optimal to accept
some deviation from efficiency if this gives rise to more revenue.”31 But because this
“deviation from efficiency” raises revenue in the input market while damaging consumer
surplus in the output market, this strategy faces a stiff burden. This Article shows that
restricting the productive use of radio spectrum is, generally, a relatively expensive
means to secure public funds from the first dollar raised. Pursuing such regulatory
strategies tends to be penny wise and pound foolish.
III. “SUCCESS” AND “FIASCOES”
[T]he economic theorists advising the Swiss government on its 3G auction
favored a multi-unit ascending auction . . . [and] also proposed setting a high
reserve price. . . .
But serious reserve prices are often unpopular with politicians and
bureaucrats who—even if they have the information to set them sensibly—are
often reluctant to run even a tiny risk of not selling the objects, which outcome
they fear would be seen as “a failure.”32

30

Klemperer, What Really Matters in Auction Design, supra note 1, at 179.
Wolfstetter, The Swiss UMTS Spectrum Auction Flop, supra note 1, at 6.
32
PAUL KLEMPERER, AUCTIONS: THEORY AND PRACTICE 138 (2004).
31
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A. General Evaluations
¶30

Wireless license auctions are typically ranked and evaluated according to receipts
raised. This metric is sometimes defined in gross revenues, revenue per capita, or
revenue per MHz per capita (reflecting bandwidth allocated to the licenses sold). Higher
bids are considered evidence of superior auction design. Table 3 shows results for the
European 3G auctions, the “third generation” licenses supporting high-speed data
services in addition to voice (1G) and narrowband data (2G) services. The auctions of
these licenses in the European Union countries occurred in 2000–2001 and constitute the
last major wave of mobile licensing.33
¶31
Klemperer identifies the British auction as successful, while rating auctions in
Austria, the Netherlands, and Switzerland as fiascoes.34 He concludes that the
circumstances separating successful from unsuccessful license assignments demonstrate
that: “auction design is not ‘one size fits all.’ The ascending design that worked very
well for the [United Kingdom (UK)] worked very badly in the Netherlands, Italy, and
Switzerland because of entry problems, and this was predictable (and predicted) in
advance.”35 A similar appraisal of the Swiss auction is offered by Paul Milgrom, who
adds a policy prescription: “Swiss authorities could have achieved a higher price if they
had wished. The auction rules could have provided that if few bidders entered the
auction, the government would sell the spectrum in the form of three licenses, rather than
four, to create meaningful competition.”36
¶32
Auctions distribute intermediate inputs. Value is ultimately created via the use of
radio spectrum to provide services to end users. The degree to which licenses enable
productive use of airwaves is not perfectly correlated with the price of licenses sold, even
when the competitive bidding process succeeds in extracting the present value of
expected profits.37 Klemperer notes that “the outcome of an auction is driven by bidders’
profits, not by the welfare of consumers or society as a whole,” and offers guidance for
constructing certain pro-competitive outcomes.38
¶33
But the conflict between efficiency in output markets and the maximization of
input market license sales has generally escaped attention. And the more fundamental
question of how rival spectrum policies affect consumer welfare is not systematically
addressed in this literature.39 Output reducing policy conclusions are often reached solely
by an examination of how auction bidding is impacted.
33

In 2010, most countries in the European Union were preparing for the auction of 4G licenses which often
involve reallocating spectrum from the television band as per the transition to digital television
broadcasting. The so-called digital dividend occurs when the move from analog to digital technology
effectively reduces the bandwidth required for the same (or greater) terrestrial broadcasting services. See,
e.g., Thomas W. Hazlett, Jürgen Müller & Roberto Muñoz, The Social Value of TV Band Spectrum in
European Countries, INFO, Mar. 2006, at 62.
34
See generally Klemperer, How (Not) to Run Auctions, supra note 1. The auction in the Netherlands is
rated a “miserable failure” in Binmore & Klemperer, supra note 1, at C93.
35
Klemperer, How (Not) to Run Auctions, supra note 1, at 844.
36
PAUL MILGROM, PUTTING AUCTION THEORY TO WORK 209 (2004).
37
Of course, the same is true of output market goods and services. With monopoly power, prices and
revenues may increase over competitive levels not due to value-added, but rather due to output restriction.
38
Klemperer, What Really Matters in Auction Design, supra note 1, at 177.
39
There are many treatments of economic efficiency in spectrum policy, but they are largely divorced from
the auction literature. See, e.g., WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & DOROTHY ROBYN, TOWARD AN EVOLUTIONARY
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TABLE 3. PRICES PAID FOR 3G LICENSES IN EUROPE40

¶34

Country

Date

$/pop-MHz

Euros/pop

Austria

Nov.
2000

0.604

100

Belgium

Mar.
2001

0.375

45

Denmark

Sept.
2001

0.623

95

Germany

Aug.
2000

3.884

615

Greece

July
2001

0.394

45

Italy

Oct.
2000

1.494

240

Netherlands

July
2000

1.093

170

Switzerland

Dec.
2000

0.12

20

UK

Apr.
2000

4.31

650

The common use of this single metric is curious given the historical economic case
for auctions. The primary advantage put forth as a reason to adopt auctions in place of
“beauty contests” or lotteries was that competitive bidding distributed licenses to those
firms that could use them most productively. This reformed arbitrary awards marked by
a rent-seeking process that made socially wasteful investments in pursuit of political
REGIME FOR SPECTRUM GOVERNANCE: LICENSING OR UNRESTRICTED ENTRY? (2006); Stuart Minor
Benjamin, Spectrum Abundance and the Choice Between Private and Public Control, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV.
2007 (2003); Gerald R. Faulhaber, The Future of Wireless Telecommunications: Spectrum as a Critical
Resource, 18 INFO. ECON. & POL’Y 256 (2006); Gerald R. Faulhaber & David J. Farber, Spectrum
Management: Property Rights, Markets, and the Commons (AEI-Brookings Joint Ctr. for Regulatory
Studies, Working Paper No. 02-12, 2002), available at
http://www.ictregulationtoolkit.org/en/Document.3629.pdf; Thomas W. Hazlett, Liberalizing US Spectrum
Allocation, 27 TELECOMM. POL’Y 485 (2003); Thomas W. Hazlett, The Wireless Craze, the Unlimited
Bandwidth Myth, the Spectrum Auction Faux Pas, and the Punchline to Ronald Coase’s “Big Joke”: An
Essay on Airwave Allocation Policy, 14 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 335 (2001) [hereinafter Hazlett, Wireless
Craze]; Evan Kwerel & John Williams, A Proposal for a Rapid Transition to Market Allocation of
Spectrum (Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n Office of Plans & Policy, Working Paper No. 38, 2002), available at
http://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/conferences/combin2003/papers/masterevanjohn.pdf; Bruce M. Owen &
Gregory L. Rosston, Spectrum Allocation and the Internet, in CYBER POLICY AND ECONOMICS IN AN
INTERNET AGE 197 (William H. Lehr & Lorenzo M. Pupillo eds., 2002); Gregory L. Rosston & Jeffrey S.
Steinberg, Using Market-Based Spectrum Policy to Promote the Public Interest, 50 FED. COMM. L.J. 87
(1997); Pablo T. Spiller & Carlo Cardilli, Towards a Property Rights Approach to Communications
Spectrum, 16 YALE J. ON REG. 53 (1999); Lawrence J. White, “Propertyzing” the Electromagnetic
Spectrum: Why It’s Important, and How to Begin, MEDIA L. & POL’Y, Fall 2000, at 19. An attempt to
bridge this gap is found in Thomas W. Hazlett & Roberto E. Muñoz, A Welfare Analysis of Spectrum
Allocation Policies, 40 RAND J. ECON. 424 (2009).
40
The source of the information in Table 3 is supplied by regulators in each country. The last column is
from Klemperer, How (Not) to Run Auctions, supra note 1, at 830.
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favors.41 Given that licenses were generally reassigned in secondary markets, allowing
the price system to select initial licensees afforded clear efficiencies, assigning spectrum
rights directly to highest valued users. This improved market performance and
economized transactions, including bargaining costs incurred in license sales. Soon after
implementation, auctions were indeed credited with improving spectrum policy,
eliminating the time and expense of non-auction assignments.42
¶35
Next to these economic gains, the diversion of rents to the public treasury was seen
as a windfall for government. These revenues could displace tax funds, reducing
economic distortions.43 Economists have generally cited all three major sources of
greater efficiency: (1) licenses go to the most efficient firms with less transaction cost;
(2) rent seeking expense is reduced; and (3) rents to the public treasury replace revenues
raised via activity-distorting taxes.44
¶36
Both economists and policy makers have issued pro forma caveats warning against
regulatory approaches that aim to maximize revenues. But they have generally
proceeded with a single-metric approach that credits greater revenues to greater “success”
when evaluating auction results. Klemperer argues the case for auctions thusly:
Even relatively unsuccessful auctions, such as the Netherlands and Italian
spectrum auctions, were probably more successful than the “beauty contest”
administrative hearings used to allocate third-generation spectrum in several
other European countries. For example, the Spanish beauty contest yielded just
13 euros per head of population, but generated considerable political and legal
controversy and a widespread perception that the outcome was both unfair and
inefficient . . . .45

Professor Klemperer’s conclusion is surely correct—the efficiencies of competitive
bidding compare favorably with those of “beauty contests.” But categorizing the Dutch
and Italian policies as “relatively unsuccessful”—an assertion based wholly on the fact
that license sales prices were low—is a deeply flawed approach to spectrum policy.
¶37
The position implicitly assumes that wireless licenses are simply “spectrum” and
that a natural resource is being sold to market participants, much like oil leases or timber
rights. The analogy is sound in some respects, but faulty in others. One problem lies in
41

Economic analysis of radio spectrum essentially began with Leo Herzel’s 1951 call for auctions,
followed by Ronald Coase’s 1959 analysis. See R.H. Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2
J.L. & ECON. 1 (1959); Leo Herzel, My 1951 Color Television Article, 41 J.L. & ECON. 523 (1998); Leo
Herzel, Comment, “Public Interest” and the Market in Color Television Regulation, 18 U. CHI. L. REV.
802 (1951); see also Thomas W. Hazlett, Assigning Property Rights to Radio Spectrum Users: Why Did
FCC License Auctions Take 67 Years?, 41 J.L. & ECON. 529 (1998); Hazlett & Michaels, supra note 2;
Thomas W. Hazlett, David Porter & Vernon Smith, Radio Spectrum and the Disruptive Clarity of Ronald
Coase, 54 J.L. & ECON. (forthcoming Nov. 2011); Evan Kwerel & Alex D. Felker, Using Auctions to Select
FCC Licensees (Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n Office of Plans & Policy, Working Paper No. 16, 1985),
available at http://transition.fcc.gov/Bureaus/OPP/working_papers/oppwp16.pdf.
42
See generally CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE? THE FCC AUCTIONS AND THE
FUTURE OF RADIO SPECTRUM MANAGEMENT (1997); WIRELESS TELECOMMS. BUREAU, FED. COMMC’NS
COMM’N, FCC NO. 97-353, THE FCC REPORT TO CONGRESS ON SPECTRUM AUCTIONS (1997), available at
http://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/data/papersAndStudies/fc970353.pdf.
43
See Cramton, Spectrum Auctions, supra note 1.
44
Id.
45
Klemperer, What Really Matters in Auction Design, supra note 1, at 186.
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the fact that the rights that wireless licenses confer are not valued according to substitutes
in global commodity markets, but according to expectations of profits in wireless
operating markets. These markets (and the profits they generate) are highly sensitive to
the policies embedded in the licenses being sold. For example, regulators may increase
or decrease license bids by increasing or decreasing the number of licenses assigned, the
spectrum allocated to these licenses, the rules governing such licenses, and so on.
¶38
The upshot is that the sale of a government-owned commodity (say, oil or timber)
generally captures (simply) a transfer price for the public. In spectrum, however, the
policies enacted within the spectrum allocation scheme will heavily influence the bids
made. Whereas the revenues collected for the standard resource auction are exogenous to
the operating market, the revenues collected in the sale of wireless licenses are
endogenous. Rules that limit wireless service competition may drive up license prices,
but such rules do not leave the operating market unaffected. Quite the reverse;
consumers are harmed. Such harms must be explicitly incorporated in an analysis
pronouncing spectrum policies “successful” or “fiascoes.”
B. Demsetz Auctions
¶39

Harold Demsetz proposed an alternative to traditional public utility regulation via a
bidding scheme for franchises.46 In instances where a natural monopoly is obtained, such
that one firm could satisfy market demand more cheaply than competitors, a sole provider
could be selected by competitive bidding. Specifically, firms’ bids would not be cast as
payments but in the form of price schedules—the rate at which the company would offer
to sell services to consumers. Thus, the market could capture the productive efficiencies
of natural monopoly and the allocative efficiencies of market competition.47

46

See generally Harold Demsetz, Why Regulate Utilities?, 11 J.L. & ECON. 55 (1968).
See generally WILLIAM J. BAUMOL, JOHN C. PANZAR & ROBERT D. WILLIG, CONTESTABLE MARKETS
AND THE THEORY OF INDUSTRY STRUCTURE (1982).
47
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FIGURE 4. DEMSETZ AUCTIONS AND LICENSE PRICES

¶40

In situations such as the one portrayed in Figure 4, a service franchise (monopoly
or otherwise) can operate according to constant marginal costs (equal to average unit
costs). If firms bid for one franchise to serve the entire market (defined by the demand
curve), and regulators select the lowest price bid,48 then that price equals pc, and the
firm—mandated by regulation to provide service throughout the life of the franchise at
that price—will produce a competitive level of output, qc. Given that the Demsetz
Auction constrains potential monopolists to reveal their long-term retail prices, a
competitive outcome obtains. A robust franchise bidding process should not produce any
government revenues since no profits are made when the price equals pc, which equals
average cost. Instead, consumer welfare is maximized, albeit with a monopoly supplier.
¶41
Were regulators to, alternatively, assign the franchise to the highest price (lump
sum payment bid to the government), the economic result markedly changes. The
winning franchisee would bid the net present value generated by setting the price to pm,
the rents available from operating as a monopolist restricting output from qc to qm. While
the government recovers the value of the franchise (rents are transferred to the public
treasury), consumers lose the low prices of competition. Moreover, the monopoly prices
charged to customers distort economic activity, inducing deadweight losses.
¶42
Regulators assigning wireless licenses face this same basic dichotomous policy
choice. Importantly, they will not generally be able to avail themselves of a Demsetz
Auction to remedy the potential output-restriction problem when licenses are sold for
their highest bids. Such an auction requires that the product be stable and well defined,
else the firms’ price schedule bids cannot be quantitatively ranked.49 Without such
48

“Price” can be thought of as the lowest price per unit. In reality, however, price will typically consist of
an entire schedule of rates (monthly service rates may be lower in one bid, but installation charges higher—
or reliability of service lower). Determining which bid implies “the lowest price” will be a non-trivial
exercise. On such practical issues, see Thomas W. Hazlett, Private Monopoly and the Public Interest: An
Economic Analysis of the Cable Television Franchise, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1335 (1986); Oliver E.
Williamson, Franchise Bidding for Natural Monopolies—in General and with Respect to CATV, 7 BELL J.
ECON. 73 (1976).
49
See discussion supra note 48.
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transparency, the bids are reduced to competing proposals to be evaluated on the
qualitative standards imposed by regulators. This is precisely the “beauty contest” or
“comparative hearings” process that competitive bidding was designed to replace.
¶43
Mobile wireless networks and services are neither stable nor well-defined; the
marketplace is rapidly evolving. Rate regulation for wireless services was abandoned in
the United States by federal statute in 1993, having failed to improve prices for
consumers even under the cellular duopoly then in place.50 Demsetz Auctions are not a
realistic option compared to pro-competitive policies that avoid franchise monopoly by
licensing rival wireless operators.
¶44
Spectrum regulators counter market power by issuing multiple licenses and making
spectrum inputs available to sustain and enhance network rivalry. This will tend to
produce the economic outcome sought in the Demsetz Auction and capture license rents
for the public treasury. But tension between efficiency in outputs and value-capture in
inputs is a built-in feature. When the focus of the regulator shifts from lower prices for
consumers to higher prices for the franchise, economic distortions can easily occur.
C. License Prices and Property Rights
¶45

The avoidance of monopoly is well understood. What bears much less notice is
that the restrictions embedded into wireless licenses—such as rules limiting services to
just voice (1G) or voice and narrowband data services (2G)—constitute analogous output
restrictions. Where such legal limitations reduce competitiveness they can make licenses
more valuable. These license rents may be captured via competitive bidding for
assignment of the rights, but this is a relatively high-cost way to raise public revenues, as
it distorts retail wireless markets. When license sales are evaluated on the basis of
revenues raised, misleading appraisals result.
¶46
It may seem obvious that licenses that are given broader scope—fuller, more
complete property rights to the allocated radio waves—would fetch higher prices.
Licensees would have more opportunities to productively use frequencies and fewer (if
any) restrictions blocking profitable new technologies or business models.
¶47
Yet this is not the case.51 Countries that have instituted decidedly liberal reforms,
granting wireless operators qualitatively wider scope to control airwaves, saw prices
about sixty percent lower than in other markets, all else equal, in a study of thirty-eight
mobile license auctions held in twenty-four countries between 1995 and 2001.52 This
result supports the view that by relaxing regulation of the input (spectrum) market,
regulators can improve future competitiveness in the output (mobile services) market.
The anticipation of greater rivalry produces lower bids.
¶48
This result seems counter-intuitive to some because additional property rights are
an incremental gain to the owner. With wireless licenses, however, property rights are
defined categorically. When regimes alter rights, pro forma rules change for classes of
assets (in this case, spectrum use authorizations). Additional rights for one licensee (a
50

Babette E.L. Boliek, Wireless Net Neutrality Regulation and the Problem with Pricing: An Empirical,
Cautionary Tale, 16 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 4 (2009).
51
See generally Thomas W. Hazlett, Property Rights and Wireless License Values, 51 J.L. & ECON. 563
(2008).
52
Id. at 564–65.
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gain for that licensee) are accompanied by additional rights for current or potential rivals
(a loss). The effect of the incremental rights on license value is therefore ambiguous.
¶49
What is unambiguous, however, is the direction of change in consumer surplus.
Customers gain when market rivalry intensifies, and liberalization (expanded spectrum
use rights and increased frequency allotments) strongly drives this market outcome.53
The effect is visible in license bids. This finding, combined with knowledge about the
relative magnitudes of social surplus in the wireless market (i.e., that the gains from
efficiency overwhelmingly flow to consumers rather than to firm profits), has important
implications. What matters most in spectrum allocation policy is the availability of
spectrum bandwidth and broad property rights to productively deploy it—not license
revenues.
D. Examples of “Cart Before the Horse” and Vice Versa
¶50

Specific examples illustrate how license assignment methods are nested in the
spectrum allocation regime. Policies with clear output market efficiency implications are
commonly evaluated solely on the basis of how such reforms alter auction receipts. This
approach is not universally the case, however, as some policies inflicting inefficiencies
are rejected. These latter policies—some of which artificially create market power,
making licenses more valuable and bids therefore higher—are sometimes identified as
instances in which auction design puts “the cart before the horse.”54
¶51
The appraisal is well put. Yet, there are many instances in which “cart before the
horse” reasoning is uncontested. The following arguments by Paul Milgrom, analyzing
spectrum auction policies, frame the general approach taken by economists:
When the likely winner of the auction is not in much doubt, the prospect of
incurring unrecoverable costs can depress entry. Spectrum auctions in Germany,
Italy, Israel, and Switzerland have all suffered from insufficient entry. . . .
. . . . [W]e show how a seller can structure an auction to encourage
entry, increase competition, and promote higher prices.55

¶52

The problem identified is that demand for licenses is insufficiently intense. In a
low demand situation, even if licenses are highly valuable to some parties, these parties
are not forced to bid aggressively, and rivalry in the auction is weak. As a result, auction
receipts lag. If license auctions are seen as purely a means to an end—enabling
productive use of airwaves—“low participation” makes rights distribution easier. High
demanders outbid others and deploy the rights sold.
¶53
Of course, a private asset owner facing this situation would likely employ measures
to extract a fuller proportion of value from the buyer. This follows from presumed
wealth-maximizing behavior, but a government facilitating access to a valuable resource
should, alternatively, strive to maximize social welfare. To achieve that goal, the policy

53

See sources cited supra note 39.
Klemperer, What Really Matters in Auction Design, supra note 1, at 185.
55
MILGROM, supra note 36, at 234.
54
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maker must enable efficiency in the post-auction output market.56 Promoting measures to
generate demand for licenses that compromise such efficiencies put the “cart before the
horse.” This is seen in the evaluation of the suggested policy remedies, which include
first-price auctions, reserve prices, bidding credits, and the withholding of licenses, each
considered here.
1. First-Price Versus Ascending-Price Auctions
¶54

Paul Klemperer establishes that a simple ascending auction is not an efficient
assignment tool due to problems related to collusion and entry deterrence:
In an ascending auction, there is a strong presumption that the firm that
values winning the most will be the eventual winner, because even if it is outbid
at an early stage, it can eventually top any opposition. As a result, other firms
have little incentive to enter the bidding and may not do so if they have even
modest costs of bidding.57

Klemperer’s solution to the problems associated with the ascending auction format is to
make it more robust to collusion and entry-deterring behavior. This is achieved with the
Anglo–Dutch design58 or a first-price sealed-bid auction, which likely generates higher
revenues for the auctioneer. Evidence from wireless telephone license auctions suggests
that revenues collected in sealed-bid auctions (first- or second-price) generally exceed
revenues generated by other formats.59 But there can be costs associated with such
approaches, including the increased probability that a “weak” player will out-bid a
“strong” one, displacing a more efficient supplier in the output market. When this
happens, higher costs offset some economies gained by more efficient rent extraction in
the license auction.
¶55
The intended point is not to argue against first-price sealed bids or to dispute the
conclusion that these auctions raise higher revenues. Rather, this Article stresses that
welfare considerations should be included in the cost-benefit calculus when input or
output markets are impacted by regulatory changes. The social losses associated with
auction rules designed to encourage participation by weak bidders are particularly
pronounced in the U.S. PCS C block auctions, discussed below.

56

This is not merely a normative view, but a result of economic efficiency. A private owner competes with
other private owners in the creation or discovery of scarce resources; the value of those resources drives the
quest for ownership. In the case of government allocation of radio spectrum, the state assumes monopoly
control over valuable natural resources to facilitate productive exploitation. Even where various public
interests are pursued, including government-regulated or government-owned spectrum allocations, the
welfare-maximizing path is to achieve such objectives in an efficient manner. This implies that the state
should not monopolize resources, but seek to enable competitive forces to expand social opportunities.
57
Klemperer, What Really Matters in Auction Design, supra note 1, at 172.
58
See id. at 170.
59
Hazlett, supra note 51, at 572.
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2. Reserve Prices
¶56

¶57

¶58

¶59

¶60

The sequential Turkish auctions held in 2000 mandated that the price for the second
license equal or exceed the price bid by the winner of the first.60 This prompted the first
auction winner to bid so aggressively that a second operator would not pay the steep
entry fee. Klemperer appropriately labels the monopoly output market result the
“Turkish fiasco”61 and a “tale of woe.”62
Yet the inefficient result is embedded in reserve prices. The purpose of a reserve
(or reservation) price is generally to raise bids by blocking the sale of a license when no
bid is made exceeding a minimum level set by the regulator. In some instances, then,
licenses will remain unsold, yielding less market competition. Moreover, regulators
typically allow the bandwidth allocated to the unsold licenses to remain idle—a second
source of efficiency loss imposed by reducing the capacity (or, equivalently, raising the
opportunity costs) of incumbent wireless operators.
Nonetheless, economists
ubiquitously advocate such policies,63 advising governments “to withhold supply and set
reserve prices to improve revenues.”64
The effect of the higher retail prices that may ensue are excluded from the
economic analysis, which therefore presents an incomplete, asymmetric evaluation.
Empirically, this Article estimates the costs associated with leaving licenses unsold due
to reserve prices imposed in Belgian and Greek 3G auctions held in 2001, and finds the
miscue of decidedly material magnitude.
It is illustrative that the remedy to the “Turkish fiasco” attempted by Turkish policy
makers was not entirely well received in the scholarly literature. When the government
moved to moot the monopoly by issuing an additional license, thereby lowering the
reservation price ex post, the policy shift was challenged on the ground that it
undermined confidence in government auction rules.65
Regulatory certainty is an important goal, but this Article argues that the policy
take-away is virtually the reverse: it is dangerous for governments to commit to policies
that exclude competitors so as to encourage higher auction bids. Once that process
begins, the state becomes complicit in a scheme to inefficiently restrict output, as in a
collusive agreement—indeed, the government structured the market, defined the rules,
sold the exclusionary rights created, and cashed the licensee’s check paid in advance to
exploit the opportunity at hand. Clearly, this is another case of “cart before the horse.”

60

Klemperer, What Really Matters in Auction Design, supra note 1, at 177–78.
Id. at 178.
62
Id. at 177.
63
See, e.g., McMillan, Selling Spectrum Rights, supra note 1, at 159; Klemperer, What Really Matters in
Auction Design, supra note 1, at 176, 178.
64
Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton, Vickrey Auctions with Reserve Pricing, 23 ECON. THEORY 493,
504 (2004).
65
Klemperer, What Really Matters in Auction Design, supra note 1, at 177 (“The credibility of reserve
prices is of special importance . . . [more competition may be achieved,] but at what cost to the credibility
of its future auctions?”).
61
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3. Bidding Credits as a “Free Lunch Policy”
¶61

Another solution to the “low participation” problem that has gained currency
among economists is the use of bidding credits:
The government could allow any firm to bid on any license, but give the
designated firms a price preference. With a preference of, say, 10 percent, a
designated firm would win if its bid was no more than 10 percent less than the
highest nondesignated-firm bid. This is a free-lunch policy. It would not only
address the public-policy goal of increasing the number of licenses won by the
designated firms, but it would also actually increase the government’s revenue.66

This approach received a boost after the FCC’s initial use of credits appeared to yield
additional revenues.67 But even before disaster struck in the PCS C and F block auctions
in 1996 and 1997, it was deducible that substantial expected costs would be incurred by
any mechanism that risked assigning licenses to relatively inefficient suppliers. Indeed,
the basic efficiency motivation for adopting license auctions is that competitive bidding
awards operating rights to those firms most able to provide high-quality, low-cost service
to the public.
¶62
Paul Milgrom makes a strong case against beauty contests and lotteries by
specifically rejecting the idea that secondary markets correctly adjust for initial awards:
“According to a famous result in mechanism design theory—the Myerson-Satterthwaite
[(M-S)] theorem—there is no way to design a bargaining protocol that avoids this
problem: delays or failures are inevitable in private bargaining if the good starts out in
the wrong hands.”68 Bidding credits impose just the inefficiency that the M-S theorem
identifies. Yet, such policies are advanced as revenue-raising devices without
consideration of inefficiency offsets. The social costs of moving away from marketbased awards are implicitly regarded as exogenous to the process.
¶63
However, that is not the case, as vividly seen in the U.S. PCS designated-entity
fiasco. Small businesses and rural phone companies (qualified designated entities)
extended bidding credits and long-term low-interest loans for PCS C (30 MHz) and F (10
MHz) licenses. The result was widespread over-bidding followed by licensee
bankruptcies, after which no use was made of the allocated spectrum while court battles
(which the government eventually lost) played out over nearly a decade.69
¶64
As this Article shows below, the social loss associated with an estimated 30 MHz
reduction in mobile services spectrum over eight years—a conservative definition of
what was incurred—is orders of magnitude larger than any plausible efficiencies
associated with rent extraction due to enhanced auction bids. That the U.S. experience
can be attributed in large measure to poor implementation, though true, is irrelevant. The
rules are endogenous to the handicapping policy. Whatever preferences are crafted,
66

McMillan, Selling Spectrum Rights, supra note 1, at 158.
See Ian Ayres & Peter Cramton, Deficit Reduction Through Diversity: How Affirmative Action at the
FCC Increased Auction Competition, 48 STAN. L. REV. 761, 763 (1996).
68
MILGROM, supra note 36, at 21.
69
See generally Robert W. Crandall & Allan T. Ingraham, The Adverse Economic Effects of Spectrum SetAsides, 6 CANADIAN J.L. & TECH. 131 (2007); Thomas W. Hazlett & Babette E.L. Boliek, Use of
Designated Entity Preferences in Assigning Wireless Licenses, 51 FED. COMM. L.J. 639 (1999).
67
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credits increase weak bidders’ chances of winning licenses, which incurs social costs and,
occasionally, policy fiascoes inflict much larger costs as well. An optimal spectrum
policy would properly account for all of these costs.
4. Withholding Licenses
¶65

Economists critical of the Italian 3G auction design have rejected rules intended to
render the Italian wireless market structure less competitive. Klemperer writes that the
Italian government “stipulated that if there were no more ‘serious’ bidders . . . than
licenses, then the number of licenses could, and probably would, be reduced.”70
Klemperer pronounces this policy “fundamentally flawed . . . [because] it is putting the
cart before the horse to create an unnecessarily concentrated mobile-phone market to
make an auction look good.”71 This Article endorses this departure from revenuemaximization—and notes that the departure directly undercuts the curiously universal
appeal of binding reserve prices.
E. Costs of Spectrum Allocation or License Assignment Delays

¶66

Huge costs have historically been imposed on consumers and businesses by
deterring competitive entry or new technologies. For instance, it is estimated that
impeding cellular telephone service by a decade cost the U.S. economy about $86 billion
in lost productivity.72 Given that a decade and a half of license auctions have produced
about $52 billion in actual receipts for the U.S. Department of the Treasury,73 this single
spectrum policy inefficiency is likely to have cost society five times the claimed public
finance efficiencies (assuming $0.33 of lost productivity is averted for every public dollar
gained).74
1. United Kingdom 3G Delays

¶67

In the British 3G auction, Binmore and Klemperer note that a three-year planning
phase was used to good effect, improving the policies adopted.75 Yet the analysis does
not consider the loss in service to the public constituted by the waiting period.76 This
Article’s simulation, summarized below, suggests that the cost to the UK economy of this
three-year delay was approximately $6.5 billion. Considering that the UK 3G auction

70

Klemperer, What Really Matters in Auction Design, supra note 1, at 185.
Id.
72
JEFFREY H. ROHLFS ET AL., NAT’L ECON. RESEARCH ASSOCS., INC., ESTIMATE OF THE LOSS TO THE
UNITED STATES CAUSED BY THE FCC’S DELAY IN LICENSING CELLULAR TELECOMMUNICATIONS (1991),
available at http://www.jacksons.net/EstimateofTheLossFromCellularDelay.pdf.
73
MOVING FORWARD, supra note 21, at 11. This total includes $13.7 billion in the 2006 AWS auctions in
September 2006, $19.1 billion in the March 2008 700 MHz license auctions, and $19.1 billion in the other
sixty-eight auctions held 1994–2008.
74
Hazlett describes a long list of wireless technologies delayed or deterred by spectrum allocation policies
in a section entitled “Silence of the Entrants.” Hazlett, Wireless Craze, supra note 39, at 375–402.
75
Binmore & Klemperer, supra note 1, at C90.
76
Similarly, van Damme notes that the Netherlands allocated spectrum for 2G licenses in March 1995, but
did not assign such licenses until February 1998, implying that the delay resulted from consideration of the
decision to use competitive bidding. van Damme, supra note 1, at 5.
71
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raised $34 billion, and assuming social savings of $0.33 per dollar raised, this delay
offset around sixty percent of the entire public finance dividend.
2. The United States’ 3G Delay
¶68

The three-year UK 3G rollout constitutes rapid progress, however, compared to 3G
licensing in the United States. In 1996, FCC Chairman Reed Hundt proposed a
reallocation of ultra high frequency television spectrum, from channels 60 to 69, and
licenses were essentially ready to auction by 2000. A congressional statute mandated
such—but eight auction postponements occurred through 2004.77 Economists actually
endorsed some of the delays.78 Finally, with the 700 MHz license auction (FCC Auction
No. 73) in March 2008 these licenses were assigned, and, with the turn-off of analog
television broadcasting on June 12, 2009, the spectrum was made available for use in
alternative (non-television) services.
¶69
More generally, U.S. spectrum allocation underwent a “lost decade.” Between the
allocation of PCS (or 2G) licenses in 1994 and their assignment by auction in 1995–1997,
no substantial spectrum allocations for mobile services were made until the AWS license
auctions in 2006. In other words, the United States simply missed the 3G licensing round
undertaken in the UK and most other advanced economies in 2000–2001, and it did so
intentionally, to satisfy policy choices.
¶70
In its first spectrum policy initiative, the Bush Administration prepared a March
2001 budget statement that recommended that 3G auctions be delayed until September
2004, calling this “a ‘win-win’ for all parties involved” and a “good telecom policy.”79
The “win-win” referred to higher receipts for government (as bids were expected to
increase over time) and gains for incumbent carriers who requested that new industry
capacity be delayed. Only consumer interests and the health of the overall U.S. economy
were omitted from the “win-win” analysis.80
3. Endemic Spectrum Under-Allocation
¶71

The problem of spectrum under-allocation, wherein a regulatory bottleneck blocks
the flow of bandwidth to its most highly valued employment, is found in the United

77

Hazlett shows how the argument that the unoccupied spectrum should be preserved to deliver high
definition television at some unspecified date in the future, has been used to delay or block new services.
Hazlett, Wireless Craze, supra note 39, at 466.
78
Ronald Harstad, Aleksandar Pekec, and Michael Rothkopf filed a Comment with the Federal
Communications Commission in January 2001. Ronald M. Harstad et al., Verizon Is Right: Delay Auction
No. 31, Comment on DA 01-143 (Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n Jan. 24, 2001). The authors filed another
Comment on February 19, 2002, which urged further delay for Auction No. 31. Ronald M. Harstad et al.,
Thorough Analysis of Package Bidding Procedures Is Still Needed, Comment on DA 02-260 (Fed.
Commc’ns Comm’n Feb. 19, 2002). The filings focused solely on the possibility that rent extraction might
have been reduced without further delays.
79
Thomas W. Hazlett, Editorial, Hostage Standoff: Virtually Worthless UUF TV Stations Strangle
Communications Progress, BARRON’S, Mar. 19, 2001, at 46, 46.
80
In the interests of reductio ad absurdum, this Article abstracts from the numerous other social interests
harmed by the intentional policy of delay. Among these are telecommunications equipment manufacturers
(shareholders and employees); U.S. businesses using wireless communications as inputs; public safety
organizations that rely on wireless networks.
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States and many other countries. This restricts the services provided to end users, raises
retail prices, and reduces consumer welfare compared to what would be obtained under a
more liberal spectrum allocation regime. Yet, perhaps the easiest way to underscore the
general problem is to look at a specific country or region where the amount of spectrum
allocated to mobile services—the dominant value-generating application in the modern
economy—is far below that allocated elsewhere.
¶72
Latin America is a region where such endemic under-allocation is visible. On
average, countries there allowed only about 100 MHz to be used by mobile operators by
2004. This was far below the allocations in, for instance, the European Union, where
countries averaged 266 MHz.81 The unallocated spectrum did not serve higher-valued
uses, but essentially lay idle. And countries with more generous allocations—such as
Guatemala, with 140 MHz—exhibited lower prices and higher usage than similar
countries that artificially restricted wireless inputs, such as Panama (50 MHz), Honduras
(65 MHz), and Nicaragua (85 MHz).82 Such policy outcomes far outweigh license
assignment choices and should be grasped as central to the regulatory analysis.
IV. TAXING LIBERALIZATION
¶73

Yet, rather than stress the fundamental mission of improving market access to radio
spectrum, much of the policy analysis goes in just the opposite direction. One line of
argument in the economics literature has developed that, “just as a competitive
telecommunications market contributes to . . . welfare, so might high auction revenue,
and therefore both objectives should be considered.”83 Hence, some seek to balance the
social gains from higher license revenues against the costs of super-competitive pricing
resulting from the imposition of suboptimal market structure. And “since alternative
taxes entail an enormous welfare loss, it is even optimal to accept some deviation from
efficiency if this gives rise to more revenue.”84
¶74
This logic was developed into a policy proposal by Rothkopf and Bazelon, which
attempts to extract rents from wireless licensees whose rights are expanded through
liberalization.85 Suppose, for instance, that a cellular phone operator is licensed to deliver
analog service but is then awarded the option to use digital technology. The enhanced
discretion constitutes an additional property right, and the ownership of that (new) right
may confer a windfall gain on the licensee.86
¶75
Rothkopf and Bazelon are critical of a “Big Bang” proposal by FCC policy
analysts,87 in which existing licensees would be granted use of frequencies in ways not
81

Thomas W. Hazlett & Roberto E. Muñoz, Spectrum Allocation in Latin America: An Economic Analysis,
21 INFO. ECON. & POL’Y 261, 261 (2009).
82
Id. at 263 tbl.1.
83
van Damme, supra note 1, at 6.
84
Wolfstetter, The Swiss UMTS Spectrum Auction Flop, supra note 1, at 6.
85
Michael H. Rothkopf & Coleman Bazelon, Interlicense Competition: Spectrum Deregulation Without
Confiscation or Giveaways (New Am. Found. Spectrum Policy Program, Working Paper No. 8, 2003),
available at http://www.newamerica.net/files/nafmigration/archive/Pub_File_1329_1.pdf.
86
Rothkopf and Bazelon assert that expanded rights will unambiguously bestow a “giveaway.” Id. at 3.
Yet, additional rights distributed to a class of licensees may reduce rents, as explained above; the windfall
may be positive or negative.
87
Id. at 3–4; see also Kwerel & Williams, supra note 39, at 4.
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specified in their licenses. This would “distribute expanded use rights to incumbents for
free or at far below their value.”88 Rejecting “Kwerel and Williams’ approach to
spectrum management that focuses solely on the efficiency gains associated with
distributing the expanded and valuable license rights,” Rothkopf and Bazelon devise a
way to extract value from incumbents granted new flexibility.89
The problem with simply auctioning the new rights is that the incumbents will
clearly be the highest bidders. Entry into the auction will be lackluster (given fixed costs
of participating), and serious bidding will be rarer still, given the expectation that license
rights are worth far more to current networks than to newcomers.
This foreordained outcome might be seen as an opportunity to save resources by
assigning rights to incumbents without an auction, a transaction cost-minimizing
strategy.90 Yet, if this approach reduces transfers to the government, license auction
revenue will presumably instead be raised by activity-distorting taxes. It is this latter
consideration that motivates the policy proposal.
To extract revenues from incumbents receiving new rights, Rothkopf and Bazelon
advocate that the regulatory authority withhold some portion of new rights from the
market, pitting incumbents against each other in bidding for a reduced number of
“windfall rights.”91 Say that there are 100 analog cellular phone carriers in 100 (or
fewer) markets, and each could profitably deploy digital technology that is prohibited by
current license restrictions. Instead of awarding 100 digital transmission rights (DTR), a
lesser number would be issued, with incumbents forced to bid (if they seek to obtain
DTR). The point of this restriction is to induce scarcity, driving the market-clearing price
of DTR above zero.
In general, the lower the government sets the number, the higher the extraction
(equal to the price of DTR) per digital operator. While Rothkopf and Bazelon’s proposal
provides that additional rights would be released over time, policies to slow assignments
would attract bids from those service providers demanding faster access to spectrum.
Their proposal “would gradually make spectrum available on a property-rights-like
basis,”92 as opposed to all at once in a “Big Bang.”93
The rights withheld are valuable to the degree that they improve the efficiency of
wireless services; incremental revenues are captured by imposing a loss of efficiency.
The magnitude of that social cost, ignored in Rothkopf and Bazelon’s proposal,
dominates plausible social gains from rent transfers to the public treasury. In fact,
considering a base case with two markets, the first auction dollar raised exceeds one
dollar in additional social cost.

88

Rothkopf & Bazelon, supra note 85, at 4 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
90
See Harold Demsetz, When Does the Rule of Liability Matter?, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 13 (1972); R.H. Coase,
The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
91
See Rothkopf & Bazelon, supra note 85, at 3–4.
92
Id. at 10.
93
See Id. at 3–4.
89
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FIGURE 5. INCUMBENT BIDS FOR A NEW RIGHT
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FIGURE 6. INTER-LICENSE AUCTIONS TO INCREASE REVENUE
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In Figure 5, the basic problem is set forth. An incumbent in Market A, Firm AI,
seeks the right to switch from analog to digital technology. The policy issue is how to
award that one new right.94 The demand curve for such rights dominates the demand
expressed by a potential entrant, Firm AE, given the substantial complementary
94

This Article assumes that wireless license rights are generic and easily defined. Hence, a continuous
demand for these rights is postulated. In fact, this is a very favorable assumption for Rothkopf and
Bazelon’s proposal. This Article also assumes that the spectrum allocation process is unaffected, meaning
that the same number of productive rights is released by regulators when incumbents receive windfalls as
when they do not. This is, again, highly favorable to the proposal.

118

Vol. 10:3]

¶82

¶83

¶84

¶85

¶86

¶87

Thomas W. Hazlett et al.

investments previously sunk by the incumbent. Hence, if an auction were to award one
additional right, the price would be bid to just about PAE . This means that rents equal to
WF are retained—a windfall to the incumbent. Rothkopf and Bazelon’s solution aims to
transfer this private gain to the public by eliminating a license award in another market,
Market B. This enables an auction between the incumbents in the rival markets, as
pictured in Figure 6.
Now the incumbent in Market A is not bidding against the entrant in Market A, but
against the incumbent in Market B. The incumbent in A must bid higher to gain the one
new right, as competition for that right is made more intense. Instead of paying
approximately PAE , the Firm AE must pay about PBI . The windfall to AI diminishes, and
increased rents go to the government. Assuming that incremental revenue ( PBI − PAE )
equals one dollar, social savings of $0.33 are generated.
This is where the proposal concludes, omitting consideration of the loss imposed on
Market B. It must be remembered that these losses are not the artifact of natural
limitations with respect to demand, but are manufactured by policy makers imposing
legal constraints on productive activities so as to leave some demand unsatisfied. But by
excluding the marginal firm (or rights claimant), a social loss exceeding the revenue
gained from the first incremental revenue dollar results, given that the loss on Firm BI is
greater than $0.33.
And this counts only the loss of producers’ surplus. As explained above,
consumers’ surplus likely exceeds surplus extracted in license bids by at least one order
of magnitude. The cost-benefit balance is overwhelmed, tipping against the withholding
of spectrum rights over any interval. This demonstrates the loss of social efficiency that
can result when license revenue extraction is the sole focus of economic analysis.
In the case where there are more than two markets and there are (again) fewer
licenses auctioned than incumbents, the comparison is less clear. Suppose that N – 1
licenses will be auctioned so that just one incumbent will be deprived of the new right
(i.e., N – N1 = 1). The market with the lowest private valuation becomes the relevant
margin, setting the license price. Calling Ai the “winning markets” and B the excluded
one, as before, Rothkopf and Bazelon’s mechanism implies the following necessary (but
insufficient) condition for efficiency:
1 N−1 1
∑( PB − PA,iE ) > PB1 + PV (CSB )
3 i=1
where PV(CSB) represents the present value of consumer surplus lost in market B.
The inequality represents the case where the exclusion of market B is compensated
by the social payoff of a less distorting revenue collection mechanism. It is not
impossible for this inequality to be satisfied, but it is implausible. First, to escape the
very high ratio of consumers’ surplus to producers’ surplus (shown above to exceed,
perhaps, 100-to-1), many licenses must be auctioned for each license withheld; yet
expanding rights issued reduces scarcity values and, therefore, revenues. In the limit, this
converges with the liberal solution—maximize market competition, worry not about
license extractions.
Second, Rothkopf and Bazelon’s tactic consciously resists this optimum, creating
artificial scarcity to puff up rents (PS) while imposing losses in output markets (PS +
CS). Given that CS likely exceeds PS by an order of magnitude or more, this is likely to
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prove penny wise, pound foolish. Doubling PS—a hugely ambitious target—could be
inefficient if CS were reduced by just one percent (an outcome dictated by a CS to PS
ratio greater than thirty-three, within the range of plausible estimates).
¶88
Third, institutional factors governing market dynamics strongly reinforce this
pessimistic conclusion concerning efficiency gains through policy-imposed scarcity.
There exists an infinite number of property rights to use radio spectrum in ways not
previously specified in restrictive licenses that specify spectrum access with respect to
technologies, services, and business models. Which rights would prove socially
productive is generally unknown ex ante. Only when applicants petition for permission
to change license terms do these new opportunities become visible to the regulator.
¶89
The policy of extracting rents from petitioners requesting permission to exploit new
wireless property rights directly taxes the discovery process wherein wireless operators
innovate in services, technologies, and business models. The object of the rights auction
is to obtain full rent extraction; the direct effect of withholding the marginal applicant’s
rights is to sacrifice the social gains from that deployment entirely. Static losses are
entirely a product of public policy, as there is no economic scarcity to be rationed among
rival rights holders.
¶90
But the spectrum allocation dynamics are likely far more costly. Taxing efficiencycreating discoveries is perverse. Indeed, in intellectual property law, the government
awards patents, copyrights, or trademarks to innovators essentially free of charge as an
inducement to socially productive activity. Regulatory permission to deploy constitutes a
barrier to entry; the more effective the system in appropriating innovators’ gains, the
lower the investment in such activity. Traditionally, spectrum-allocation rigidities have
imposed high barriers to innovation, long the subject of normative criticism by
economists.95 Incumbents would be protected by such a system, with competitive entry
deterred via tax policy.
V. A REGULATORY OPTIMUM
¶91

This Part defines what an optimal regulatory policy might achieve, assuming that
an FCC-type spectrum allocation regime exists.96 It assumes that the regulator pursues
95

See Gregory L. Rosston & Thomas W. Hazlett, Comments of 37 Concerned Economists, Promoting
Efficient Use of Spectrum Through Elimination of Barriers to the Development of Secondary Markets, WT
Docket No. 00-230 (Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n Feb. 7, 2001), available at
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/files/rc/reports/2001/02_economists_litan/02_economists_litan.pdf.
96
Under an FCC-type regime, the government treats radio spectrum as state property and then makes caseby-case determinations as to how spectrum access rules will be crafted. The ostensible aim is to facilitate
the efficient deployment of wireless services, and the basic rationale driving this structure is that there
would be endemic chaos were there no central allocation mechanism in place. Coase demonstrated the
weakness of the argument by showing that rules limiting spectrum access can be imposed as property
ownership rules. See generally Coase, supra note 41. The latter enables resource appropriation choices
(including “spillovers”) to be determined by asset owners under competitive conditions as opposed to
government regulators. The liberalization of allocations for mobile phone licenses, where spectrum use
choices tend to be broadly delegated to operators, follows Coase’s normative suggestion. Observed results
in mobile markets strongly support his intuition as to the efficiency of decentralized property rights. See
Thomas W. Hazlett, Optimal Abolition of FCC Spectrum Allocation, 22 J. ECON. PERSP., Winter 2008, at
103; Hazlett, Porter & Smith, supra note 41. Some spectrum regimes—including those in Australia, New
Zealand, Guatemala, and El Salvador—have gone further, instituting general liberalization by statute.

120

Vol. 10:3]

¶92

¶93

¶94

¶95

¶96

Thomas W. Hazlett et al.

policies to maximize social welfare and focus for ease of analysis on the market for
wireless telephone service.97 This goal can be summarized in three objectives: (1)
allocate spectrum to promote the most efficient delivery of wireless services; (2) select a
mechanism to assign licenses that maximizes social value; and (3) subject to these
constraints, distribute licenses so as to maximize the present value of payments to the
government.
The first goal concerns decisions made before licenses are assigned; indeed, it
encompasses the procedure wherein licenses are created. Here, the regulator constructs a
bundle of rights to assign to private parties and establishes rules shaping industry
structure and performance, fundamentally determining expected license rents.
A less concentrated market structure tends to increase price competition. Yet, scale
and scope economies are pronounced in mobile markets, and dynamic (Schumpeterian)
efficiencies may be improved where relatively efficient firms increase market share.
Both fixed and variable costs tend to increase when the amount of spectrum assigned to a
license is reduced, as happens when additional licenses share a given allocation of
bandwidth. Given the costs and benefits of market concentration, this Article’s
hypothetical regulator designs policies to produce an optimal market structure.
The second goal is to assign licenses such that total welfare is maximized. As van
Damme comments, this concept, “market efficiency,” can differ from “value
efficiency.”98 Because “bidders are guided by shareholder value and not by consumer
surplus, . . . at best one can expect an auction to produce an allocation that is ‘value
efficient.’”99 Market efficiency might, for example, be improved by auction rules that
improve post-auction market structure.100 Of course, limits on incumbents’ bids also
have costs, as vividly seen in the U.S. PCS designated entity preferences.
The third goal focuses on raising revenues for public use. This Article’s
assumptions isolate this process to one of pure rent transfer. In this context, higher
revenues are unambiguously preferred to lower revenues. In actual policy-making,
however, the assumption is a strong one. It is violated when incremental revenues are
extracted by withholding productive rights.101
It is worth noting that license auctions are largely independent of the first goal,102
are useful tools for the second, and are primary mechanisms used to achieve the third.
Hazlett, supra note 51, at 582–86. Other countries—notably Norway, the United Kingdom, and the United
States—have undertaken regulator-led reforms expanding market spectrum allocation. See generally ERIC
BASH ET AL., KB ENTERS., SPECTRUM LIBERALIZATION: APPROACHES IN FIVE COUNTRIES—AUSTRALIA,
NEW ZEALAND, NORWAY, THE UNITED KINGDOM, AND THE UNITED STATES (2009), available at
http://kbspectrum.com/wp-content/uploads/2009/10/KBE-Spectrum-Liberalization-FINAL.pdf.
97
The path taken generalizes easily, as spectrum rights are flexible and can be used to accommodate other
wireless services as dictated by consumer demand.
98
van Damme, supra note 1, at 7.
99
Id.
100
See Richard J. Gilbert & David M.G. Newbery, Preemptive Patenting and the Persistence of Monopoly,
72 AM. ECON. REV. 514 (1982), for an excellent discussion of preemptive patenting, directly applicable
here.
101
See discussion supra Part IV.
102
It is commonly held that governments allocate more spectrum so that they can auction licenses and raise
additional government revenue. See, e.g., Eli Noam, Spectrum Auctions: Yesterday’s Heresy, Today’s
Orthodoxy, Tomorrow’s Anachronism. Taking the Next Step to Open Spectrum Access, 41 J.L. & ECON.
765 (1998). The evidence is decidedly mixed. Sometimes revenues appear as drivers, but governments
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These distinctions are important. This Article argues that the first goal is by far the most
important one in terms of its impact on social welfare. This policy defines the amount of
spectrum available in the market to provide services and heavily influences final market
structure by, among other things, defining the number of available licenses.
¶97
The main task of auction design is to assign rights to the most efficient service
providers. With market efficiency, this selection process does not conflict with the third
goal: maximum revenues for the auctioneer. High revenues, which have been
interpreted as a signal of a well-designed auction, are properly used as a metric when the
policy design maximization is subject to the constraint of market-efficiency. And, viceversa, when the pursuit of high revenues conflicts with market-efficiency, the signal is
likely to be highly misleading.
VI. CONCLUSION
Assigning, or licensing, is the last step in the process of granting a right to use a
part of the spectrum and has only limited consequences for economic efficiency
in the context of the overall system.103

¶98

What really matters in spectrum allocation design? The evidence indicates that the
answer is two-fold: spectrum and competition in final markets. This conclusion holds
after adjusting for the social savings possible from efficient rent extraction via license
auctions.
¶99
Yet, the economic analysis of wireless license auctions has focused on revenues
extracted from bidders, seeing the “embarrassingly low revenue in the Netherlands,” for
example, as indicating a fiasco in public policy.104 It might also be noted that the Dutch
succeeded in making 355 MHz available for wireless phone operators, more than any
other European Union country. Alternatively, U.S. regulators then made only about 170
MHz of bandwidth available for use in wireless telephone markets—an outcome that
merits little scholarly attention despite the “fiasco” it has produced in lost productivity.
¶100
Indeed, a decade-long loss of 30 MHz in the U.S. mobile market stemmed from the
use of bidding credits in the 1995–1997 PCS auctions—a policy that was praised in the
economics literature as a way to boost bid prices in license auctions. The policy did
indeed succeed in raising winning bids. But the winners were not efficient providers.
Moreover, the revenues went largely uncollected while the spectrum lay idle for years.
These policy errors cost consumers in excess of $70 billion, more than all FCC license
auction revenues in total, and thereby far out-stripping any social gains from this source
of public rent extraction. Such collateral damage of the revenue-enhancement strategy
has been unanticipated in policy analysis. It should not be.

sacrificed substantial rents for many decades by refusing to auction any wireless licenses. Hazlett, Porter &
Smith, supra note 41. Were revenue a driver of additional allocations, regimes that use competitive
bidding to make awards would allocate substantially more spectrum than nations that do not, ceteris
paribus. While this Article holds that the evidence rejects this, further research on the political economy
questions may add useful clarity.
103
CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, AUCTIONING RADIO SPECTRUM LICENSES 3 box 1 (1992).
104
Wolfstetter, The Swiss UMTS Spectrum Auction Flop, supra note 1, at 6 n.8 (citing Paul Klemperer,
What Really Matters in Auction Design (Nuffield Coll., Oxford Univ., Working Paper, 2000)).
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Spectrum use is assumed to be exogenous to competitive bidding for licenses. If
true, rents transferred to government in auctions would, by definition, have no social cost.
But policy recommendations that include reserve prices, bidding credits for weak bidders,
and a reduction in the number of licenses issued incur expected social costs. These
measures thereby breach the assumed line of demarcation. In addition, auction designers
have intentionally or unintentionally imposed substantial delays in license assignments,
depriving markets of valuable inputs.
¶102
This Article does not argue against the use of license auctions; just the reverse.105
Auctions can be highly useful in eliminating the costs of secondary market recontracting,
one of the reasons that random distribution of licenses (as was done by lottery for most
cellular permits in the United States) is inefficient. Paul Milgrom’s explanation of why it
misuses the Coasian analysis to argue for random license assignments is well taken.106
Yet this efficiency rationale itself conflicts with proposals commonly made and with
judging “successes” and “fiascoes” based on prices paid. Policies that alter market
structure or the availability of spectrum inputs are not exogenous to spectrum allocation.
¶103
By increasing bandwidth allocated to market competitors, promoting rivalry among
licensees, and expanding property rights granted to licensees, very large efficiency gains
are possible. As shown in this Article’s simulations and in empirical research concerning
the importance of technological standards, competition liberalization of wireless markets
is likely to be the key policy component driving substantial gains in social welfare.107

105

One of the authors of this Article argued publicly for FCC license auctions years before Congress
enacted reform. See Thomas W. Hazlett, Making Money Out of the Air, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 1987, at A35;
Thomas W. Hazlett, Editorial, Dial “G” for Giveaway, BARRON’S, June 4, 1990, at 12.
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